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Abstract
Background: Most developing countries face important challenges regarding the quality of health care, and there
is a growing consensus that health workers play a key role in this process. Our understanding as to what are the
key institutional challenges in human resources, and their underlying driving forces, is more limited. A conceptual
framework that structures existing insights and provides concrete directions for policymaking is also missing.
Methods: To gain a bottom-up perspective, we gather qualitative data through semi-structured interviews with
different levels of health workers and users of health services in rural and urban Rwanda. We conducted discussions
with 48 health workers and 25 users of health services in nine different groups in 2005. We maximized
within-group heterogeneity by selecting participants using specific criteria that affect health worker
performance and career choice. The discussion were analysed electronically, to identify key themes and
insights, and are documented with a descriptive quantitative analysis relating to the associations between
quotations. The findings from this research are then revisited 10 years later making use of detailed follow-up
studies that have been carried out since then.
Results: The original discussions identified both key challenges in human resources for health and driving
forces of these challenges, as well as possible solutions. Two sets of issues were highlighted: those related to
the size and distribution of the workforce and those related to health workers’ on-the-job performance.
Among the latter, four categories were identified: health workers’ poor attitudes towards patients,
absenteeism, corruption and embezzlement and lack of medical skills among some categories of health
workers. The discussion suggest that four components constitute the deeper causal factors, which are, ranked
in order of ease of malleability, incentives, monitoring arrangements, professional and workplace norms and
intrinsic motivation. Three institutional innovations are identified that aim at improving performance:
performance pay, community health workers and increased attention to training of health workers. Revisiting
the findings from this primary research making use of later in-depth studies, the analysis demonstrates their
continued relevance and usefulness. We discuss how the different factors affect the quality of care by
impacting on health worker performance and labour market choices, making use of insights from economics
and development studies on the role of institutions.
Conclusion: The study results indicate that health care quality to an important degree depends on four
institutional factors at the microlevel that strongly impact on health workers’ performance and career choice,
and which deserve more attention in applied research and policy reform. The analysis also helps to identify
ways forwards, which fit well with the Ministry’s most recent strategic plan.
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Background
Most developing countries face considerable challenges re-
garding the quality of health care. There is an increasing
consensus that many of the problems have to do with both
the performance and career choices of health workers, as
they form the foundation of health service delivery. Issues
like health worker absenteeism, poor attitudes towards
patients, shirking and embezzlement have been well docu-
mented across a number of contexts and countries.1 But
although recent work in development thinking emphasizes
a central role of institutions, generally defined as the ‘rules
of the game’,2 surprisingly little work focuses on microeco-
nomic institutional factors for health service delivery, in
particular those related to human resources, which is the
focus of this paper.3 The study’s aim is to explore which in-
stitutional factors may help explain the (often disappoint-
ing) performance of health workers, who actively respond
to the work environment and incentives they face.
One potential reason for the scarcity of work in this area
is that it is unclear what the relevant theoretical frame-
work should be. Under these circumstances, exploratory
analysis provides a useful starting point, to identify the
problems and characterize the institutional factors that
may offer explanations, as also suggested by Mookherjee
[70]. This can then serve as a base for the formulation of
theory and hypotheses.
The core of this paper is based on findings from primary
qualitative research, which has been successfully applied for
this purpose across disciplines, especially in medical and an-
thropological research. We conducted semi-structured group
discussions with health workers and users of health services
in both rural and urban areas in Rwanda in 2005.
Despite substantial economic growth and significant finan-
cial resources allocated to the health sector, Rwanda’s health
outcomes remained poor and below target; this was the case
in 2005, at the time of the data collection, and remains the
case today. Major health indicators including infant, child
and maternal mortality as well as life expectancy at birth
have remained below the Sub-Sahara African average [106].
The Government of Rwanda did major efforts to rebuild the
health system, and this resulted in important improvements
in health infrastructure. Nevertheless, the utilization of
health services remained low at 38%, with a declining trend
in utilization between 1997 and 2003 [62]. This low
utilization occurred despite a high population density—a
stark contrast with most Sub-Sahara African countries—and
a traditionally mixed public-private health sector, which
could work in favour of utilization. Analysts agree that hu-
man resources for health formed the main explanation for
this poor performance and a key constraint for better health
service delivery in Rwanda. With respect to workforce size,
Rwanda had a low health worker to population ratio, even
by Sub-Sahara African standards: for eight out of nine staff
categories, Rwanda scores below the regional average.4
Community health workers are the only exception, as
Rwanda has comparatively more of them. Like most coun-
tries, Rwanda also faced a shortage of health workers in rural
areas, even though these areas could be reached relatively
well. In 2006, only 17% of health workers in the public sector
took up a job in a rural area [63].
Since the early 2000s, Rwanda accelerated the imple-
mentation of important changes in the health sector.
The fieldwork for the first phase of this research was im-
plemented while these changes took place, giving us a
unique perspective on the impact of these perceived
transitions according to both users and health workers
themselves. In a second phase of our research, we then
revisit the findings of this first phase 10 years later.
In the next section, we describe the methodology and
data, while the ‘Findings from primary qualitative re-
search 2005’ section discusses the results from the group
discussions. The ‘Revisiting the findings in 2015’ section
provides findings from the second phase of the research,
while the ‘Discussion’ section provides a discussion of
the findings, and the ‘Conclusion’ section concludes.
Methods and data
Qualitative research offers strong tools for exploratory ana-
lysis. Group discussions in particular are useful when the re-
search wants to reveal and contrast a multitude of
perceptions and opinions and have been used with success
in both medical and market research.5 The factors described
in this paper emerged from analysing the qualitative data we
obtained from semi-structured group discussions with health
workers and users of health services in Rwanda. Following a
strict methodology in the preparation and implementation,
we held discussions with 73 individuals, 48 health workers
and 25 users of health services. We held six separate group
discussions with different levels of health workers—doctors,
nurses and auxiliary health workers, half of them in an urban
area, the other half in a rural town—and three group discus-
sions with users: one in an urban area, one in a provincial
town and one separate discussion with Persons Living with
HIV/AIDS (PLWHA). To allow for a richer exploration, we
maximized within-group heterogeneity by selecting the par-
ticipants using a number of criteria that affect performance
and career choice, like age, gender, having children or not,
the sector of activity (private for profit, private not-for-profit,
public), the type of facility (hospital, clinic, health post),
having multiple jobs or not and working at a facility with a
performance initiative. Table 1 presents the group and indi-
vidual profile of the participants.6 The groups are overall bal-
anced in terms of gender and in terms of the number of
children participants have. Health workers are predomin-
antly active in the public sector which both reflect reality
and the focus of this study. Most of them supervise other
personnel active in the health facility.
Serneels and Lievens Human Resources for Health  (2018) 16:7 Page 2 of 22
This first part of the study was implemented in
November 2005, and the discussions took place in a
meeting room in a health facility, were semi-structured
using detailed scripts, lasted on average 2 h and a half
and were held in French for the doctors, nurses and
pharmacists and in Kinyarwanda for the auxiliary health
workers and the users.7 All discussions were recorded
and transcribed in French, which was the second na-
tional language at the time, together with Kinyarwanda.
The transcripts were then coded and subsequently ana-
lysed following the four steps set out below. During the
coding, a label was attributed to each unit of text or
quotation, reflecting the underlying content of the topic
discussed. A quotation can be given different codes when
it refers to different topics at the same time. Where this
occurs, the association of codes can be analysed. In total,
1203 quotes have been examined and 35 codes have been
used, reflecting the diversity of the issues of interest in the
study. The text was then analysed with QSR NVIVO, to
identify emerging key themes and insights.
The analysis is carried out in four steps. In a first step, all
quotes by participants are grouped in more or less homoge-
neous groups, called ‘free nodes’; no pre-established node-
structure is used. In total, 27 free nodes were identified; some
examples are ‘performance evaluation’, ‘remuneration’ and
‘performance pay’. In a second step, logical relations between
free nodes were identified, creating a node tree-structure. A
third step further explores relationships between free nodes,
for example, verifying whether participants make reference
to ‘performance pay’ when talking about ‘performance evalu-
ation’ to examine relationships that might not be explicitly
apparent. Finally, we compare the number of quotes per
topic. A large number of quotations is seen as suggestive of
the relative importance of that topic to health workers. A
low number of quotations corresponds to the situation
where the interviewer has prompted health workers about a
Table 1 Discussion groups and participants
Kigali Provincial town Total Percent of total
Focus groups 5 4 9 100
Auxiliary nurses (A3 and A4) 1 1 2 22
Nurses (A1 and A2) 1 1 2 22
Doctors (A0) 1 1 2 22
Health users 1 1 2 22
Persons living with HIV and AIDS 1 0 1 11
Health workers 24 24 48 100
Of which: Auxiliary nurses 8 8 16 33
Nurses 8 8 16 33
Doctors 8 8 16 33
Female 17 8 25 52
With children 22 19 41 85
Below age 36 15 10 25 52
Public 18 20 38 79
Private for profit 13 2 15 31
NGO 1 2 3 6
Has formal second job 3 2 5 10
With performance initiative 11 16 27 56
Users 17 8 25 100
Of which: Persons living with HIV/AIDS 9 0 9 36
Other patients/users 8 8 16 56
Female 10 3 13 52
With children 17 8 25 100
Last visit in health centre 7 7 14 56
Last visit in hospital 10 1 11 44
Last visit in public sector facility 13 5 18 72
Last visit in private for profit sector facility 2 0 2 8
Last visit in NGO/faith-based facility 2 3 5 20
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topic but gets very few replies because the topic is not an
issue. The analysis then focused on those issues with the lar-
gest number of mentions. Three categories of themes
emerged: problems and challenges, key explanatory factors
and ongoing and planned innovations. The nature of the ex-
planatory factors that received most attention alerted the re-
searchers to the overarching role of institutions, which is put
forward as the appropriate conceptual framework to inter-
pret the findings. The quotes reported in this paper are se-
lected because of their salience and because they reflect
themes and issues recurrently brought up by participants.
In a second phase, we revisit the findings from this pri-
mary research 10 years later relying on several in-depth
studies that have taken place in Rwanda since then, as well
as official documents from the Government of Rwanda.
The studies were primarily identified through search of
Google Scholar, PubMed and Econlit and databases of PhD
theses. Other ongoing research, research under review and
policy reports were identified through google search and
through consultation of experts on health care in Rwanda.
The data limitations are twofold. The choice for group
discussions in the first phase, while deliberate in order
to generate a broad set of insights, comes at the expense
of being able to carry out analysis at the level of individ-
ual health worker. Second, the revisit of the findings
from the first phase makes use of a different method,
using insights from existing studies. This allows for a
richer comparison and evaluation in some ways but also
has a cost; for instance, it does not allow for consistent
comparison across these same respondent groups.
Findings from primary qualitative research 2005
The discussions centre around two big clusters of in-
sights: those to do with identification of health worker
problems and challenges and those related to possible
solutions to these problems. We discuss each in turn.
Problems and challenges?
What are the challenges with human resources for
health in Rwanda? It emerges from the discussions that
these can be divided into those related to the size and
distribution of the workforce and those associated with
health workers’ on-the-job performance.
Size and distribution of the workforce
Health worker participants in the discussions highlight the
existing shortage in number of health workers but also point
to shortcomings in human resource practices and education
policies that exacerbate the situation. Facilities that have been
mandated to recruit staff directly often seem to lack the re-
sources to do so. As a consequence, especially junior nurses
often have to wait before they can take up their first job. On
the education side, it is a mystery to most health workers
why there is still a cap on entry into post-secondary medical
education (‘numerus clausus’), while the limited access to
secondary education in general restricts the number of
students who can enrol for either nursing or medical studies.
Since health workers can express a preference where to
work, the least popular positions tend to be understaffed.
This is especially the case for higher educated health workers
who are less numerous and can therefore be more picky
about their place of work. One example is the shortage of
health workers in rural areas. When health worker
participants talk about frustration and dissatisfaction in the
profession, they frequently relate this to rural postings (15%
of the cases). Private sector positions are often more popular
than public sector ones, while jobs in public health seem to
be more popular than those in clinical care, because they are
often better paid, but also because they involve no health
risks. When a job compensates for these kinds of risks, it
manages to attract health workers. The discussions suggest
that higher earnings contribute to the greater popularity of
private sector jobs: when health workers discuss high pay, in
15 out of the 17 cases, they refer to the private sector, for-
profit or NGO’s, and often mention HIV/AIDS services.
While shortages in some positions—for instance in
rural areas—are real, they should not be taken as a fait
accompli. Job attributes, including earnings, can be changed
in order to make these positions more attractive. Moreover,
health worker preferences are heterogeneous, with some
choosing to provide health care where it is needed most,
and preferences can be moulded, as we discuss later.
Observation 1: Unbalanced allocation of health workers
Rural areas are intolerable; life is difficult. If you want your child to grow,
you cannot accept to work in a rural are. When you go there, you will
plunge yourself in a routine, will not be able to increase your living
standard, and you eventually become a peasant.
Auxiliary worker in Kigali
It is Siberia!
Doctor in Kigali
In a rural area, a doctor kills himself. He looses all elements that make
up a real doctor, and will end up with 25% of what he knew.
A doctor in a rural district
Nurses working in the rural areas are not satisfied and insult the
patients; while doctors working in the rural areas become bitter to the
point they don’t take hitchhiking patients, and all that because they’re
stuck in the rural areas.
User in Kigali
(…) there’s no plan of development for a doctor working in the rural
areas; once you’re affected to the rural areas, it’s as if you’re lost in the
rural areas. The lack of this career development for the doctor in a rural
area means that once you’re affected or mutated, it’s like a punishment.
Doctor in a rural district
Problems related to on-the-job performance
Apart from shortages, health workers’ on-the-job per-
formance forms a second set of problems. In the
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discussions, health professionals and users identified
four categories of challenges. Firstly, many health
workers have poor attitudes towards patients and seem
to have weak patient management skills. They are fre-
quently impolite and rude, favour some patients above
others and often care little about patients’ long waiting
times. This is important for users, as 61% of the user
quotes are about health worker attitudes and their re-
ception of patients. Absenteeism among health workers
is a second problem. Many health workers stay absent
from work during parts of the day—sometimes the en-
tire day—and this appears to be mostly related to a sec-
ond job and is particularly high among health workers in
urban areas and among doctors. About 40% of the
quotes on absenteeism (26) refer to doctors. A third
problem is the presence of corruption and embezzle-
ment among health professionals. Conduct varies from
asking bribes to helping patients jump the queue or es-
cape high bills, to asking extra payment for outside-
hours services, or falsification of documents. Monetary
gifts are at times seen as no more than a token of grati-
tude. Embezzlement of drugs and materials also occurs,
often to be used in the provision of informal care or to
be sold on in the market (especially for drugs). The dis-
cussions generated 73 quotes on inappropriate behav-
iour, indicating that it is firmly present. Examples, when
used, mostly refer to unorganized and petty corruption.
A final problem is the lack of medical skills among
health professionals, especially among nurses and auxil-
iary health workers, who are concerned about their own
lack of knowledge, for instance, in how to deal with
HIV/AIDS. The latter is confirmed by people living with
HIV/AIDS, who complain about the lack of knowledge
among health staff.
All four types of performance challenges appear to
be far more important in the public than in the
private and faith-based sectors. Patients confirm that
health worker attitudes are better in private-for-profit
and faith-based facilities; health workers point out
that absenteeism, corruption and embezzlement are
lower in the private sector. Both patients and health
workers suggest that this has to do with the higher
pay, the superior monitoring and accountability mech-
anisms and the difference in work culture in the
private sector, while health workers in faith-based fa-
cilities are also perceived to be more committed. But
the respondents suggest that the situation in public
facilities is improving with both absenteeism and
embezzlement of drugs apparently falling. The imple-
mentation of performance-related premiums, the
training of health workers on quality assurance and
the increased monitoring of health workers by com-
munity representatives are perceived as playing an
important role.
Observation 2: Performance problems among health
workers
Poor attitudes
To receive the patients well, you need sufficient and capable
personnel. The faith-based sector has enough personnel and
equipment, but the public health centre often lacks personnel
and equipment. Therefore people don’t like to go to public
health centres.
User in a rural district
Health workers in the public sector may receive patients badly
because they know there are no consequences, but in the private
sector the employer is usually around and observes how things are
done.
Auxiliary health worker in Kigali
.. and if you dare saying you feel bad, they react angrily which makes
you even sicker.
User in Kigali
There was a mother who took her ill baby to the hospital asking for
drugs and the nurse said ‘Go away, when your baby dies, I will deliver
another one for you’; the nurse is still working at the hospital;
unfortunately the baby is dead.
User in Kigali
Health workers [in the public sector] insult patients who are for example dirty.
Auxiliary worker in Kigali
Absenteeism and shirking
Doctors are more absent in the public sector than in the private sector.
Doctor in a rural district
To some of the remote health centres, you can go and find no one to receive
you.
User in a rural district
When the State has prevented you to take up another job, for example
with an NGO. Then, you just act as if you work.
Doctor in Kigali
Many health workers pretend to work.
Doctor in Kigali
Corruption and embezzlement
Patients paid more than was reported in the register, we’ve found many
of those cases.
Auxiliary worker in Kigali
There may for example be an agreement between the patient and the
nurse: the patient leaves at night and in the morning it is observed
that the patient left without paying. In fact he has given money to a
nurse.
Doctor in Kigali
Some doctors sign medico-legal documents making things up.
Nurse in Kigali
The theft of small material is really very frequent but you can never
know who did it.
Auxiliary worker in Kigali
We had a case where nurses embezzled drugs, sold them, took the
money of the community and used it for their proper consumption.
Doctor in a rural district
The embezzlement of drugs had become important but now we
require that when leaving the office you show the next person what is
not there.
Auxiliary worker in Kigali
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Lack of technical skills
There are health centres headed by an auxiliary health worker; this leads
to problems regarding the quality of care.
Doctor in Kigali
In our health centre there’s only one A2 nurse. When she leaves for
training, I remain alone and do everything without being properly
educated. I do it but it really is a problem.
Auxiliary worker in a rural district
Our knowledge is not sufficient. The training that is administered does
not arrive at our level.
Auxiliary worker in a rural district
The central role of institutional factors
Four institutional factors emerge from the discussions that
have a determining influence on the quality of care
provided, by affecting either or both performance or career
choice: incentives, monitoring and accountability, norms
and workplace culture and intrinsic motivation. We discuss
each in turn.
Extrinsic incentives
The discussions indicate that insufficient reward is the single
most important source of frustration among health workers:
25% of the quotes about low satisfaction refer to low
remuneration. Especially lower level health workers indicate
that their earnings are not sufficient to satisfy the basic need
of family life. Because wages are modest, health workers
often engage in secondary activities. This has an effect on
their performance, and health workers argue that they would
perform better if they would get a higher salary. Other
rewards associated with a job also help explain job
preferences. Posts in rural areas, for example, come with
lower access to infrastructure and good schools, lower
availability of secondary activities, and lower access to
alternative employment opportunities; they also are also
associated with personal and professional isolation, which
may limit future career opportunities. Doctors, for instance,
have almost no incentive to work in rural areas since they
earn more, can specialize, and enjoy a higher quality of life in
urban areas. Because of this large difference between urban
and rural areas, remoteness benefits, which typically
represent only a small percentage of the salary, is likely to
have limited effects, although they may help attract some
health workers. More detailed quantitative analysis is needed
to find out what premium is needed.
Differences in rewards also help explain the choice
between sectors, but again, only to some extent. Although
many health workers prefer to work for the private for-
profit sector, which pays the highest wages, some prefer to
work for the public sector because it offers higher job se-
curity, access to training, and access to medical care at a re-
duced cost. Still others prefer to work in the faith-based
sector, which follows the public sector salary scales but pro-
vides additional benefits, including on the job training.
Thus, salaries by themselves seem to have some but limited
power to attract health workers to certain positions.
Observation 3: The importance of incentives for
health worker performance and career choice
Earnings
Doctors’ salaries should be increased in order that, when he goes to
work he does not go to work for just some hours and then goes
elsewhere to earn more.
User in Kigali
If we want a doctor to deliver a good service, he needs to have a good
salary, to live, to ensure his family can live, and to ensure that when he
treats 10 patients, they are treated well.
Person living with HIV/AIDS
If our salary were increased, we would work better and, moreover, be
extremely happy while at work.
Auxiliary worker in a rural district
We have friends - lawyers, economists, and others - and when we
talk to them, we hear what they earn, and find that they earn much
and work little.
Doctor in a rural district
In the private sector or in an NGO, one earns a lot of money.
Nurse in Kigali
Public health pays best. They are paid but do not have to work.
Doctor in Kigali
Other attributes
There is the training, medical care, annual salary increase. The most
important advantage of the public sector is the access to low cost
medical care; we only pay 15% of the bill, even of the drugs.
Nurse in Kigali
Stability
What’s important is the job stability. In the public sector one has more
security even if one is not paid as good as in the other sectors.
Nurse in Kigali
It’s true we’ve been talking about salary and other problems in the
public sector, but it’s not like with those Americans [who are investing
in public health by starting new NGOs] who are here for a set period
only and will leave afterwards, so they can chase you out any time.
Then it’s better to earn a small but regular sum of money.
Auxiliary worker in Kigali
In private health centres, one never signs a contract. You just draw up a
convention and when it’s necessary, the employer fires you, but as long
as you work well, he keeps you.
Auxiliary worker in Kigali
Training
An advantage of the public sector is that one receives training.
Auxiliary worker in a rural district
If we had the choice between training and salary increase, we’d choose
training.
Nurse in Kigali
A specialisation is generally obtained in the public sector; it’s far more
difficult to specialise in the private sector.
Doctor in Kigali
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Public-private
You can’t compare the faith-based sector with the public sector, for
example, in certain faith-based hospitals, they have specialists coming
over and staying for one or two months and then you receive training.
Doctor in a rural district
Rural urban
In the public sector, it is encouraged to work in the rural districts and
you receive a premium.
Nurse in Kigali
It’s necessary to have a second job. Experience shows that almost all
doctors in Kigali have a second job. In the rural areas, this is not
possible because there are no opportunities for a second job.
Doctor in a rural district
What we would need to be motivated to go to a rural area? A salary
increase. Equipment. The possibility for further training. Access to
education for the children.
Doctors in a rural district
Doctors in the rural areas have a particular reputation in the medical
corps, they make many mistakes and do things in a mediocre way.
Doctor in Kigali
In the rural areas, a doctor would kill himself You loose all that makes
you a real doctor, you end up with 25% of what you knew.
A doctor in a rural district
Monitoring and accountability
Health workers and users have much to say about
monitoring and accountability with 80 quotations directly
attributed to this theme. They confirm that it is difficult for
employers to monitor health worker performance and that
monitoring and accountability systems can differ greatly
across sectors and locations; they are weaker in the public
than in the private and faith-based sectors and less present
in remote areas. Users point out that health workers are not
sufficiently accountable. Sanctioning for bad performance is
unheard of, according to health workers themselves, except
for specific and extreme cases of recurrent misbehaviour, like
drinking or fighting at the workplace. Especially doctors are
weakly supervised. The annual performance evaluation sys-
tem that is in place in the public sector, which aims at moni-
toring individual behaviour, is seldom used and perceived as
subjective where it is used. The current efforts from the
Government of Rwanda to attribute a larger role to
community monitoring and to reduce the need for moni-
toring by making pay more dependent on performance
have created high expectations; we evaluate these new in-
terventions in the ‘Discussion’ section.
Observation 4: Monitoring and accountability
There’s no system of supervision in the public sector.
Doctor in Kigali
Here in the hospital, a nurse can commit a professional mistake but
there is no law that can punish him.
(Continued)
User in Kigali
In the faith-based sector, health workers are continuously monitored. It’s
impossible to have time wasted.
User in a rural district
In the private sector, you’re sacked even for a minor mistake, but in the
public sector you’re sacked only if you’re really impossible.
Auxiliary worker in a rural district
It also depends on where you work; fraud can occur in public health
centres, but in the faith-based or private sector it’s far more difficult
since the control is much more rigorous.
Doctor in a rural district
We have an annual evaluation that should normally be sent to the Ministry of
Health, but it is not respected and is not being done regularly.
Nurse in Kigali
Performance is evaluated using an evaluation form, but it is of no use
because there is a problem of objectivity: who evaluates whom and
how?.
Nurse in Kigali
I give everybody “very good”; it’s subjective because there are no objective
criteria.
Doctor in Kigali
Professional norms and workplace culture
The discussions confirm that professional norms are
typically acquired during professional training, and
there are indications that the strength of norms varies
across schools. Workplace norms are said to vary
substantially across sectors. Private for-profit facilities
seem to be more client oriented but also more money
oriented and have a heavier work load, while health
workers in not-for-profit facilities have a reputation
for being dedicated. Public sector facilities have the
most damaged image and are perceived as having
weak work ethics. Some workplace norms have been
transformed into bylaws, which health workers are ex-
pected to follow. The increasing role of the Ordre des
Médecins, a professional self-governing association of
medical doctors established in 2001, gives health
workers high hopes for monitoring professional
norms, enforcing internal rules and providing credible
punishment where needed. Nurses have expressed
their hopes that they too would have a professional
association soon.
Observation 5: Professional and workplace norms
The regulations are clear, if you are working for the government, you
are expected to have a certain attitude.
Doctor in a rural district
The bylaws consist of a number of rules to follow. If a person does not
respect a rule, he is told so and informed about the sanction, the first
time orally, the second time in writing. If it happens another time, the
sanction is applied.
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Nurse in a rural district
If you compare the public and the faith-based sector, you’ll find that
there are more problems in the public sector because the health
workers know they cannot be sacked easily.
User in a rural district
I have the impression that there is a system when it really goes very
badly, when it is absolutely clear that there is a problem, then,
something is done, the person is blamed or something else.
Doctor in Kigali
Since the order of doctors has been created there have been
investigations undertaken, and some doctors have been suspended.
Doctor in a rural district
People love to go to the private sector because the health personnel
speak kindly. They treat few patients and take time to speak at length with
them; consequently, when the patients leave the health centre,
they are very happy.
Auxiliary worker in Kigali
Intrinsic motivation
Health workers in Rwanda make generous use of a religious
vocabulary when describing their motivation to work in the
health sector, using words like ‘vocation’, ‘devotion’ and
‘apostolate’. They attribute an important role to motivation,
arguing that one needs to have high intrinsic motivation to
surmount low pay relative to high effort, poor working
conditions, limited career perspectives and a risk of
contracting HIV/AIDS. Some argue that intrinsic motivation
is related to religious beliefs and that those working for the
faith-based sector are ‘more committed’ to their job. In gen-
eral, the discussions indicate that there is substantial hetero-
geneity in motivation. And because of its importance, health
workers are concerned that the performance initiatives,
which provide bonuses according to reaching quantifiable
objective, may erode commitment by stimulating a more
‘mechanical’ behaviour.
Since public health workers can to some extent choose
the location of their job, those with high intrinsic
motivation tend to self-select into positions they like, for
instance in the faith-based sector or in rural areas. The
for-profit sector, which tends to put higher demands on
health workers and provides higher payment, may attract
a different profile of health workers. The public sector
seems to attract those who plan to continue for further
specialization or those who do not find a job in the (for-
profit or not-for-profit) private sector.
Observation 6: Intrinsic motivation
Some say being a health worker is an apostolate.
Doctor in a rural district
Whether you want it or not: when you study medicine, you have a
vocation. If you do not have this vocation, you will fail. A doctor needs
to be permanently devoted; a doctor without devotion is not a doctor.
(Continued)
Doctor in Kigali
When you have a vocation it is impossible to do something else.
Auxiliary worker in a rural district
There is always this vocation, which pushes you to continue even if
conditions are not met: the salary, the equipment, the other colleagues,
the professional environment; but since lives are threatened, you are
pushed to continue, the situation is more or less comparable in the
public, private or faith-based sector.
Doctor in a rural district
We always work longer than the planned timetable, it’s a vocation; you
cannot leave a patient because it’s time to go.
Nurse in Kigali
Health workers in the faith-based sector are more committed to their
work compared to those in the public sector.
Auxiliary worker in a rural district
Today, health workers only seek money.
Person living with HIV/AIDS
Institutional innovations to improve performance
Related to the above, three innovations that were in the
process of being implemented at the time of the research,
received much attention in the discussions: the gradual
implementation of performance pay, the establishment of
community health committees and the training of health
workers in attitudes and patient management skills.
Performance pay
In the private for-profit sector, pay is typically related
to performance, and workers who perform well re-
ceive a higher salary. This has inspired policymakers
to introduce performance-related pay in the public
sector. In 2001, the Government started the Initiatives
for Performance (IP) in a number of public and faith-
based facilities, making part of the funding that a fa-
cility receives dependent on its performance. Import-
antly, performance is not measured at the individual
level but at the facility level. The reward thus goes to the
facility, if it performs well, who determines itself how to
distribute the premium among its employees. It may de-
cide to pay higher wages to better performing health
workers, or it may also decide to hire extra personnel.
In general, the IP receives a positive evaluation from both
health workers and users in our discussions. Health
workers monitor each other more than before, and this has
improved their performance. IP appears to have had both a
quantitative and qualitative effect: it seems to have
increased the number of vaccinations, as well as pre- and
postnatal care, and curative care (which are all part of the
targets); it also seems to have improved the attitudes of
health workers towards patients, the general quality of care
and the teamwork among health workers. A reported
shortage of IP is that while it translates mostly into extra
payment—almost half (14 out of 30) of the quotations on
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performance pay refer to payment modalities—it does not
necessarily lead to improved career development. Users’
highlight another potential downside, namely that it
encourages health workers to implement certain activities
mechanically, thereby eroding the overall quality of care.
Thus, although it may induce health workers to put more
effort in their job, users fear that effort will be directed
towards certain activities, usually the more profitable.
Measuring performance at the facility rather than at the
individual level reduces this tendency to some extent, by
increasing peer monitoring and team motivation. Some
health workers are also dissatisfied with the lack of
transparency of how the premium is distributed within
the facility. Finally, IP has created high expectations
but cannot address all shortcomings. Health workers
complain that it has not solved the lack of equipment
and the shortage of technical skills of health workers.
Observation 7: Performance pay
A health worker knows that if he does not work well, if he is absent, if
he is too late, if his service is not appreciated, this will decrease the
premium that the health centre receives. It makes that personnel
controls each other. Everybody knows that the one that works badly
can be sacked and risks being accused by his colleague; this leads to a
higher degree of accountability and higher productivity.
User in Kigali
You’re the only doctor to consult. But with the IP, one recruits, and
instead of one doctor, you’re for example five. So there’s an
improvement in the work conditions and you’re no longer stretched.
Doctor in a rural area
Now, we see that there’s improvement in the motivation of health
workers. Regulations have been developed by each health centre and
have to be followed. The regulations are such that when they are not
followed, part of the premium is withdrawn, which makes the personnel
more accountable and more responsible. We are more conscious of
what we have to do. The stability of our personnel is also assured by
this premium.
Nurse in Kigali
Patients are better received, the guards are better organised, but as for
quality, technically spoken, there has not yet been improvement
because there is no technical support, no equipment.
Doctor in Kigali
In vaccination for example, before the premium we asked ourselves why
we had to fetch children that were not vaccinated, but since IP, we are
obliged to go and search the one child that has not been vaccinated
because we know that this activity is paid for.
Nurse in a rural district
There’s inequality in the distribution of the premium, even if we do the
same tasks and have the same diploma.
Auxiliary worker in Kigali
It is a good initiative, but performance should not just be acknowledged
in financial terms, I think people also want advancement in their career,
they want promotion.
Doctor in Kigali
But what often happens is that after a while, there’s the risk of routine,
to carry out lots of activities that are not necessarily of good quality;
something that can make the Initiative for Performance perpetual is a
constant monitoring system.
Doctor in a rural district
Community health committees
As part of a wider move towards decentralization and the
involvement of local communities in governance and
management of the health centres, in the spirit of the
Bamako Initiative, the Government of Rwanda encourages
the establishment of Community Health Committees. So
while performance pay encourages self-monitoring and side-
ways monitoring, Community Health Committees increase
monitoring from below through community health workers
who represent the patient population. One of the risks of this
type of decentralization is the capture by local elites [6]. In-
deed, those in a privileged position may capture these new
powers from the community and use them directly for their
own benefit, for example, to employ loyal community
members.
The discussions suggest that community health
committees help address the lack of accountability of
health workers, especially in rural areas. By letting
community representatives have a seat on the health
committees, they can use their discretionary power to give
financial rewards to well-performing health workers and
use disciplinary measures to badly behaving health workers.
Users argue that the approach has led to an increase in the
quality of care, mainly because of lower absenteeism and
improved attitudes towards patients. Because information
on health worker behaviour is mostly available at the local
level, community health workers seem to close the informa-
tion gap that typically exists between the higher-level health
administrators and local health service providers. The fact
that Rwanda has a high population density, also in rural
areas, may be an important contributing factor to the suc-
cess of the approach.
Observation 8: Community monitoring
The health committees give these performance bonuses; if someone is
absent, the bonus is stopped. Donors also give bonuses; if someone
comes too late three times in a month, the bonus is stopped.
Auxiliary worker in Kigali
To find a health worker reading a book when you visit a health centre
does not happen anymore. It happened before, but now, they fear the
health community workers.
User in a rural district
When a nurse doesn’t interact in the right way with patients,
community health counsellors can take action; they can decide to
fire him.
User in Kigali
Since the decentralisation the health centre is managed by more than
one person, and there is a representative of the State, but there is also a
representative of the population, who sits on the health committee. This
committee can decide, for example, to pay the rent of a health worker,
or to give him a premium, etc.. All this is on top of his salary. Sometimes,
workers with an equal qualification do not receive the same bonus.
Auxiliary worker in Kigali
The health committees give performance bonuses; if someone is absent,
for instance, thebonus is stopped. Donors also give bonuses; if someone
comes too late three times in a month, the bonus is stopped.
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(Continued)
Auxiliary worker in Kigali
Since community health assistants control the functioning of the health
centre, these problems do not exist anymore. If a nurse does not
behave well towards patients, community health assistants take
decisions for this nurse. They have the power to hire and fire. This is
why the health centres function better today.
User in Kigali
Today, representatives of the population control the functioning of the
health centre; if you’re absent, even an ordinary citizen can accuse you
by saying for example ‘I’ve seen him in that place and he wasn’t
working’. When the population has a meeting, the one who has seen
you or has had a problem will make it public.
Auxiliary worker in Kigali
Sometimes the population nominally accuses personnel of the public
hospital in the newspapers.
Auxiliary worker in Kigali
If the health committee is willing, if you’ve worked well, they can take
money out of the financial reserves of the health centre and thank you.
For example, at the end of each year, I don’t know whether it’s to thank
us, they take us where we want, we eat, we drink and the health
committee pays the bill.
Auxiliary worker in Kigali
Training
The government of Rwanda has started to increase the
provision of training for health professionals to change
their attitudes and practices. The discussions suggest that
this training has been effective. Health workers argue that
it has helped to improve the quality of care. Users draw
no causal conclusion, but it is hard to say whether this is
because the initiative is too recent, because its effects are
limited or because users do not know about the training.
Future evaluations may help shed light on this.
Observation 9: Training
Since the training on quality assurance there’s improvement in the
attitude of health workers.
Auxiliary worker in Kigali
In the past, before the training on HIV, someone who was suspected to be HIV
positive was abandoned to himself, he was not treated, but that actually does
not exist anymore, with the training, we help them, we treat them.
Nurse in a rural district
Revisiting the findings in 2015
A number of studies and reports that have taken place since
2005 document whether and how things have changed.
Three observations come to the fore. First, despite
improvements, substantial problems and challenges remain,
similar to those identified in the 2005 group discussions.
Second, interventions were implemented have had mixed
impact. Third, institutional factors remain a central force
that helps explain failures and successes of health care
delivery. We discuss each in turn.
Despite improvement, problems and challenges remain
There have been considerable improvements in health
outcomes in Rwanda since 2005. Maternal mortality rate fell
by 72% (to 210 deaths per 100 000 live births in 2015), under
5 mortality decreased considerably (from 152 to 50 per 1000
live births), while life expectancy increased to 66 years [71].
Attribution of these changes to specific programmes remains
a challenge, as discussed below. And despite these
improvements, substantial problems and challenges remain,
both in terms of outcomes—for example, the sustained
chronic malnutrition (38%) and neonatal death (39%)
[71]—and in terms of processes and inputs. Rwanda remains
ranked in the bottom 20% for human development, poverty
and several health indicators [74]. In what follows, we assess
the extent to which this is related to poor personnel
performance, using the two dimensions identified in the
group discussions: the number and distribution of health
workers, and health worker on the job performance.
Despite considerable improvements in health worker
numbers, including community health workers, substantial
shortages remain. Recent figures suggest an overall health
worker density of 0.72 per 1000 inhabitants, with the
number of doctors having increased from 0.002 to 0.06
doctors per 1000 population, which is still far below the
WHO recommended 2.5 health worker per 1000 inhabitants
[65, 99]. More detailed figures suggest a gap of 50% between
available and required staff, varying from 34% for General
Practitioners to 86% for midwives [66, 67]. In-depth quanti-
tative analyses highlight the remaining skewed distribution of
doctors and nurses in favour of urban areas [85] and sum-
marizes the key challenges as threefold: a general shortage of
midwives; a maldistribution of doctors across hospitals, with
shortages in some hospitals but not others; and a shortage of
nurses’ time spent on health care rather than receiving and
counselling patients, which should be done by social
workers; the latter are overrepresented in hospitals (159% of
what is needed) and lacking in health centres (20% of what is
needed), [64].
Other studies detail the challenges with health
workers’ on-the-job performance. Lannes [50], using a
simple index per facility, finds that average health work-
force productivity went down over the considered
period.8 One third of health workers were reported ab-
sent in primary health care facilities, and this increased
further with an estimated 16% 1 year later. It is poorly
understood why this trend has occurred.
Another study assesses health workers’ on-the-job per-
formance and found that less than 10% of patients were
routinely screened for chronic conditions like anaemia,
malnutrition, HIV or tuberculosis [100].9 Nurses were
found to correctly diagnose 50% of patient complaints and
to provide the correct treatment 44% of the time. The me-
dian duration of consultation was 6 min. Prevention coun-
selling had low rates. The quality of decision-making was
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independent of the nurse’s experience. The study concluded
every aspect of the routine to be in need of strengthening
and quality improvement and identified needs of nurse
training and standardization of care. Brown and McSharry
[20] illustrate the wanting accuracy of child growth meas-
urement and find that use of electronic tools would allow
for superior tracking of health information in rural and
urban Rwanda.
These substantial shortcomings in performance confirm
those observed in other studies. A cross-country ranking
of health care delivery across Rwanda, Tanzania and
Uganda indicated that Rwanda performed only slightly
better than its neighbours, despite scoring lower on some
health outcomes, confirming structural weaknesses [1].
Detailed studies on these two other countries provide a
depressing picture of a human resources characterized by
high absenteeism (55 and 21% on average),10 limited time
on the job, high variability in case load,11 and low accuracy
in diagnosis, with between 19 and 57% providing a correct
diagnosis, depending on the condition12 ([107], 2017).
Policymakers have become increasingly aware of these
challenges, and improving Human Resources for Health
has now become a central part of the Ministry of
Health’s strategy, as expressed in their current HRH
Strategic Plan 2015–2018 and HRH Operational plan
2016–2018 [65, 67].
Mixed impact of interventions and innovations
The lower than expected performance documented above
relates to the mixed impact of four policy interventions
that have been implemented since 2005: increases in
health worker numbers and skills, performance-based pay,
changes in governance of the health sector and the rollout
of mutual health insurance. All of these changes were ini-
tiated before 2005, as is also clear from the discussions,
which frequently refer to them, and have been scaled up
and accelerated since then. Overall, we find that these in-
novations had mixed effects, bringing about some im-
provements but also unintended consequences; if
anything, they seem to confirm the key findings from the
qualitative research and underline the primary role of in-
stitutional factors. We discuss each of them in turn.
A second change that took place is the further rollout
of the Initiatives of Performance (IP). After initial years,
a pilot study was implemented in 2005 to test the pay
for performance programme, which was then scaled up
over the subsequent years.13 Much speculation took
place about the programme’s impact (positive or
negative), but evidence remained absent until more
recently. This more recent rigorous evaluation suggests
heterogeneous impact, with beneficial effects on the use
and quality of child and maternal care and on the
quality of prenatal care [7]. Impact was largest on those
services with the highest payment rates and requiring
the least effort from the service provider.14 These
findings suggest that IP does affect some dimensions of
the average health worker’s behaviour, but not others,
and remains agnostic about health worker individual
responses.
Later studies look at other impacts of IP. They find
that absenteeism reduced in IP facilities, but only by a
modest 6% [50]. IP had a negative effect on recruitment:
less nurses were recruited in facilities that have P4P, and
this led to lower replacement, resulting in 21% fewer
nurses in treatment facilities compared to control
facilities [50]. The reason for this remains unclear. It
may be that performance pay facilities are more efficient
in service delivery and thus require fewer staff to
perform the work or that the IP workplace is less
attractive for prospective health workers. IP also had a
positive impact on overall patient satisfaction and
satisfaction with waiting times, but not satisfaction with
provider or cleanliness ([50]). Extension of the previous
evaluation finds that IP primarily increased access for
patients who are relatively easier to reach and who also
tend to be the more affluent, but had less impact on the
poorest members of society [51].The impact of pay for
performance on community health workers is the
subject of another recent large scale study, which finds
no effect on the coverage of services that were targeted
or on the behaviour and attitudes of the community
health workers who were incentivized [90].
Modifications in governance of the health sector constitute
a third area of intervention. Reforms aimed at further
encouraging and formalizing the establishment of
Community Health Committees increased decentralization.
In 2008, health facilities were granted formal financial and
administrative autonomy. Unfortunately, there is no formal
evaluation of the different steps of decentralization, including
the increased role of communities in the management of
facilities. One report, relying on descriptive data, suggests
decentralization had a positive impact on health governance
mostly related to accountability, responsiveness, efficiency
and effectiveness [97], but attribution and causal inference
remain a challenge with the descriptive data. It also remains
unclear what the overall impact on health worker behaviour
is, as increased monitoring often invites strategic behaviour
and ‘gaming’ [46] and opens opportunities for local capture.
A final policy intervention has been the further scale-up
of Mutual Health Insurance.15 Between 2000 and 2003,
building on previous experience, over 100 Mutual Health
Insurance schemes were implemented [81]. This led to an
estimated 27% of the population being covered with Mutual
Health Insurance in 2004, rising to 74% having some form
of health insurance cover in 2007 [69]. An evaluation study
in 2011 highlights the scheme’s association with demand-
side changes, including increases in utilization and in-
creased protection of users against sudden health
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expenditures. While this may have contributed to improve-
ments in health outcomes, there has been no study on the
impact on health worker performance and quality of care.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that it has put more strain on
health personnel: outreach may have gone up, but it is un-
clear what the impact on quality of care has been.
A central role of micropersonnel institutions
The studies consulted in phase two confirm a key role
for the four institutional factors identified in the first
phase of the research. The role of earnings as incentives
is generally recognized in the studies, including those on
performance pay. One study also demonstrates the role
of earnings for job choice and finds that close to 40% of
nursing students and 7% of doctor students are willing
to work in a rural area at the going wages, while an
average premium of 71 and 57%, respectively, would be
required to get 80% of new nurses and doctors to take
up a post in a rural area (where 80% of the population
lives) [85]. The role of other job attributes, including
access to training, general career support and
possibilities for career planning, is mentioned in several
studies. Overall, the picture that emerges is one of
health workers receiving improved but still mixed
incentives, and limited support, to perform well.
The second set of factors, monitoring and accountability,
also receive considerable attention in the studies and reports.
Nurses and community health workers in particular seem to
receive limited supervision and monitoring [26, 101].
Interventions that aim at increasing health worker
responsiveness and accountability, like IP and community
monitoring, seem to have had some but mixed success.
Professional norms represent a common theme
throughout the above studies, which underline their
importance for performance benchmarks for health
worker of all levels [50, 90, 101]. The role of
motivation, while long recognized, is also receiving
increased attention in the recent analysis. Studies on
community health workers highlight the central role
of motivation for their performance, while others
analyse its importance for health worker job choice
(see [26, 90, 85]).
Discussion
The problems identified in the group discussions and
confirmed in later studies are consistent with those
arising in other contexts and countries, in sub-Sahara
Africa and beyond. Qualitative research for Ethiopia
identifies very similar challenges [61], while work by
Jaffre and Olivier de Sardan [45] find comparable prob-
lems for most capital cities in Francophone West Africa.
Recent work in this journal and elsewhere also identifies
similar issues (see for instance [13, 37, 58]).
The findings underline, first of all, that health workers
make conscious, albeit constrained, choices about where,
when and how to work. While this may seem obvious, it
is in contrast with much of the work on human
resources in the health sector, which still views health
workers as passive actors and assumes that they have
uniform preferences. The findings also indicate that
these choices depend crucially on four institutional
factors: extrinsic incentives, monitoring arrangements,
norms and intrinsic motivation. All four factors affect
both the career choice and performance of health
workers. In what follows, we discuss each of these four
factors in turn.
Extrinsic incentives
Health workers see remuneration and other pecuniary
and nonpecuniary benefits as a central issue when
talking about performance. This fits with the classic
view of management and economics that people who are
paid more, perform better. There is, however, little
consensus why this is the case, as the relationship can
go both ways. Workers may perform better because they
are paid more, or they may receive higher payment
because they perform better. In a public sector context,
where rewards are heavily regulated, the question then
becomes whether the rewards are sufficiently high both
to make existing health workers perform well and to
attract, and retain, high-performing candidates.
Empirical evidence on the relationship between
payment and performance in the health sector remains
limited. Some insights can be gained from studies on the
effect of wages on labour supply. Evidence for high-
income countries finds estimated elasticities of labour
supply with respect to wages to be low,16 but the scarce
evidence for developing countries suggests a higher re-
sponsiveness of health workers to wages in this context.
One study finds a short-run elasticity of labour supply
with respect to wages of 0.58 for self-employed practi-
tioners in China [77]. Recent work on absenteeism
among health workers confirms that there are limits to
the power of incentives, with often more than one third
of health workers being absent, whatever their salary.17
The strongest correlates of absenteeism seem to be non-
wage factors, including facility conditions, provision of
housing and cost of getting to work. A separate set of
studies looks at the impact of earnings on corrupt be-
haviour on the job and suggests that its effects are small.
Barr et al. [8], for example, using a behavioural experi-
ment, find that earnings reduce embezzlement but that
the effect is limited. Van Rijckeghem and Weder [103],
using cross-country data, find that higher public servant
salaries (relative to manufacturing wages) are associated
with less corruption, but neither Treisman [95] nor
Rauch and Evans [78] have been able to replicate this
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result. They do find suggestive evidence, however, that
employment security and recruitment and promotion
have a more important effect on corruption, suggesting
that job attributes in a more general sense have a larger
effect on performance.
Besides their impact on labour supply and on-the-job
performance, incentives and rewards also affect health
workers’ career choices. Compensating wage differential
theory argues that jobs with less attractive attributes typ-
ically offer higher wages. A number of studies show that
willingness to work in a rural area is strongly influenced
by pay18 and other benefits, as also mentioned in the
discussions.19 This is confirmed by quantitative research
with future health workers in their final year of study
[85]. Remuneration can also differ across sectors, more
specifically the public, the private for-profit, and the not-
for profit sectors. Results for other countries, including
Ethiopia and Ghana, indicate that many health workers
prefer to work in the private for-profit sector, which typ-
ically offers higher salaries and better physical infrastruc-
ture [53, 89].
The discussions suggest that access to training is an
important factor for job choice. This is in line with
studies for other countries,20 and often seems to be an
important motivation to work in the public sector,
which tends to provide the most opportunities for
further training and specialization. However, senior
management may not select or allocate training
opportunities based on professional need or as part of
staff career development. Rural jobs may provide lower
access to training, but they can offer thorough first-job
experience, which is strongly appreciated by some health
workers and employers alike.
The findings of our research confirm that incentives
and rewards matter but that health workers take a much
broader set of incentives into account than the ones that
are usually considered. Apart from earnings, which
include the health worker’s salary and her compensation
for overtime, other financial benefits like the health
worker’s pension, the per diem she receives for fieldwork
or training and the reimbursement of health care costs
for his family members are also important. Non-
financial benefits, like access to training, job security,
chances of promotion and other contractual stipulations
that affect career planning, are also recognized as im-
portant job attributes. Finally, indirect factors that are
associated with the place of work, like access to quality
housing and infrastructure, including good education for
their children, and access to other income opportunities,
including for instance a second job, also play an import-
ant role (see [87]).
Summarized, incentives in this more general sense
seem to be important to help explain health workers’
career choice and performance, probably more so than
existing empirical research—which typically focuses on
earnings in narrow sense—indicates.
Monitoring and accountability
Monitoring and accountability form a second factor that
affect both the performance and career choice of health
professionals. This fits with theoretical considerations
which emphasize that, when work is characterized by
multiple tasks for which the outcomes are difficult to
observe, employment contracts are highly incomplete
leaving plenty of scope for moral hazard.21 The role of
monitoring has attracted growing attention in the
analysis of service delivery and public service. Generally
speaking, monitoring can take different forms: agents
can be monitored from above—in our case by their
superior or a representative (an inspector); from
below—by their clients or the community they serve; or
from aside—by their colleagues and peers. Regarding the
subject of monitoring, there are two approaches:
monitoring can focus on outcomes or on processes. An
important question is how much monitoring is needed.
Too little monitoring is ineffective, while too much is
inefficient and may negatively affect performance as it
may erode motivation. Also important is the sanctioning
mechanism. Monitoring is likely to have limited effect
without credible sanctioning. Serneels et al. [86],
studying absenteeism in the health sector in Ethiopia
and Rwanda, observe that punishment in case of
detection is very unlikely, rendering any monitoring
strategy mostly ineffective. There is, however, limited
detailed empirical evidence on the role of monitoring
and accountability because one needs variation in
monitoring regimes to study its impact. Bjorkman and
Svenson carry out a fascinating investigation of the
potential benefits from community monitoring, which
will be discussed in the ‘Community health committees’
section. Existing work on the education sector indicates
that monitoring can have large effects.22 But supervision
is not without challenges. Health workers ‘gaming’ the
system has been a common concern, especially when
stakes attached to the reported behaviour are high.23
One example for Udaipur shows how the initial success
of a scale-up of automated monitoring of health worker
attendance in the public sector was eroded in the
medium term, because health workers had increased
their ‘exempt’ days, a consequence of induced machine
problems. Evidence from behavioural experiments also
suggests that how a monitor is appointed—for example,
whether he is elected by the community or not—can
also have important effects (see [8]). Concerns of ‘gam-
ing’ are highly relevant for the health sector in Rwanda,
where increased monitoring by use of a database of indi-
cators [21] combined with performance pay may steer
health worker behaviour in the direction of improving
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indicators, possibly eroding the overall quality of services
[46]. It may also induce falsifying data to obtain more fi-
nancial means.24
Summarized, the findings indicate that the arrangements
regarding monitoring and accountability often tend to
be weak. Sanctioning, for example, is usually absent
or lacks credibility. However, given the wide range of
tasks in which a health worker is typically involved,
while the need for monitoring is high, the very nature
of the work makes monitoring a challenge, calling for
more innovative approaches. Performance pay and
community monitoring seem to be effective in some
ways, but a concern remains about keeping the
consequences of gaming the system to a minimum.
Recent work suggest that training, coupled with
regular local follow-up supervision, may be a promis-
ing route [101].
Norms
The group discussions highlight the importance of norms
related to professional and workplace culture. Professional
norms are typically acquired during medical education and
training, and the study suggests that the strength of these
norms may vary across schools. Later research confirms the
importance of such performance benchmarks, standardized
practice and norms [101].
Norms can generally be seen as an implicit way of
monitoring or an implicit contract enforcement device
[35]. Professional norms are believed to be fundamental in
constraining opportunistic behaviour among service
providers, especially in the health sector (see for example
Frank [40, 36, 37, 93]. For our purpose, we see three
relevant levels of norms: society-wide norms, professional
(peer group) norms and workplace norms. Society-wide
norms are relevant because one expects that, ceteris pari-
bus, corruption among health workers will be higher if
there is more corruption in society at large. Peer group
norms are important since they determine professional
success and recognition; they are guarded by a profes-
sional body, like the Order of Physicians. At the level of
the workplace, norms provide a way of monitoring daily
behaviour like attitudes towards patients, work ethic and
engagement in corrupt activities.
The discussions suggest that health workers who are
surrounded by a culture of poor performance; for
example, those in the public sector are more likely to
also perform poorly, while those working in a place
encouraging performance—for example in the faith-
based sector—perform much better while receiving the
same salary. That norms directly affect a worker’s
performance and career choice confirms both existing
theory and evidence, suggesting that workers internalize
norms over time—be it at the level of the workplace cul-
ture, the profession or society at large—to guide their
own behaviour [30].25 Vasan (2015), in a pilot study, of-
fers a detailed example for Rwanda, demonstrating how
training that aims at improving health workers’ adher-
ence to preferred practice can have significant effects on
health worker behaviour. Recent work for high- and
middle-income countries suggests that management
practices matter for clinical outcomes of hospitals [17].
Little rigorous evidence exist on the role of workplace
culture and management in low-income countries and
beyond hospitals. One study illustrates its potential im-
portance, observing that absenteeism among health
workers in Rwanda is higher in facilities without a head
of facility present ([50], p. 84). While this is a topic of
great interest, more research is needed.
Intrinsic motivation
In the group discussions, health workers as well as
patients talk about the importance of ‘vocation’ and
how ‘commitment’ may be different across sectors.
This suggested role of intrinsic motivation for both
performance and career choice has historically been
recognized for the health sector (see [30]). Recent
empirical studies for Rwanda confirm its role [26, 85, 90],
Intrinsic motivation has received increased theoretical
attention.26 It is typically defined as the urge to do
something for its own sake and comes about as the
internalization of norms over time. Since this is a slow
process, intrinsic motivation is considered exogenous in
the short run. It affects output, in the sense that more
motivated health workers tend to perform better. It can
be seen as a self-enforcing contract that leads to a higher
performance outcome [30].27 A weakness of many
existing payment schemes is that they do not take into
account the heterogeneity in motivation, an issue that
performance pay may be able to help address to some
extent.
Intrinsic motivation also affects career choice as it is
highly correlated with career preference [87]. Individuals
prefer a job that satisfies their intrinsic motivation. An
important question is therefore how candidates are
allocated to jobs. In Rwanda, matching takes place through
a largely unregulated market—thus taking into account
differences in preferences and intrinsic motivation. Recent
evidence for Zambia demonstrates that the type of
motivation of health workers matters, showing that newly
recruited community health workers, who aspire to
becoming a ‘highly trained health worker’, perform better
than those who primarily want to ‘learn about health issues
in the community’ [4]. Combined survey and lab-
experimental evidence for Rwanda indicates that health
workers with higher pro-social motivations choose to work
in not-for-profit organizations [88].
Although intrinsic motivation is considered constant in
the short term, it may change in the long term for two
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reasons. First, new norms may be internalized over time. For
instance, health workers who happen to work in a corrupt
environment may revise their norms and get socialized into
corruption (see [8]). Second, extrinsic incentives may crowd
out intrinsic motivation. Seabright [82] illustrates how
satisfaction derived from intrinsic motivation may conflict
with that derived from extrinsic incentives, explaining why
paying for activities that are done out of intrinsic motivation
may reduce performance. Titmuss [94] makes a similar
point much earlier emphasizing the importance of altruism
in the organization of blood donation. Existing evidence is
inconclusive whether such crowding out takes place and
how important it is. A recent randomized experiment on
mission matching among community health workers in
Zambia suggests that incentives can also crowd in
motivation and improve performance as well as job choice
(see [3], [83], respectively). These results call for more
analysis of how and where intrinsic motivation matters.
Institutional innovations
Three institutional innovations were highlighted during the
discussions and in later studies as most relevant for
personnel performance: the implementation of performance
pay, the increased role of community health committees and
enhanced provision of professional training.
Performance pay
Health workers as well as patients brought up a range of
issues related to performance pay. Later studies carried
out formal evaluations of different aspects of IP. One
key study finds that IP led to an increase in use of
service with highest payment and lowest effort,
accompanied by a possible increase in quality of care [7],
with larger effects for relatively better off patients.
Follow-up studies find that it positively affected process
quality, but not structural quality [72], possibly increased
work force productivity [50], reduced absenteeism [50,
72], had negative effects on recruitment and positive im-
pact on some aspects of patient satisfaction (waiting
times), but not others (cleanliness) [50]. Where it was
successful, this is believed to have relied crucially on per-
formance being measured and incentives being offered
at the facility level. This is important for a number of
reasons. The multidimensional nature of health makes it
difficult to summarize health outcomes in one compact
indicator. Moreover, with some dimensions measured
more easily than others, such a measure would steer
performance in a specific direction. The complementar-
ity of tasks carried out by different health workers is
another argument in favour of rewarding performance at
the facility level. This approach also provides an oppor-
tunity to strengthen facility management where rewards
linked to individual performance may weaken it.
These results are mirrored by a recent systematic
review of eight studies in five developing countries,28
which confirms that performance pay can have positive
effects on maternal and neonatal health outcomes, but
has possibly negative effects on structural quality [27].
On the whole, the existing evidence suggests that
result-based finance increases the volume of services de-
livered with some evidence that it also improves the
quality of care [105]. A recent study for Cambodia
shows that the number of births occurring in public
health facilities increased, but the effects also depended
on household wealth [102]. Evidence on absenteeism
and availability of health care providers is consistent
with the findings from other studies on result-based fi-
nance [44, 46]; evidence on the impact on productivity is
scarce and inconclusive. The Rwanda results on recruit-
ment contrast with findings for DRC where performance
pay led to recruitment of more staff [92]. Other recent
overview studies, focusing mostly on high-income coun-
tries, suggest a variety of possible effects,29 underlining
the need for more systematic and comparative analysis.
Community health committees
The possible beneficial role of community health
committees has been widely discussed in the
literature in descriptive terms. Much less is known
whether this institutional change had a causal impact
on the behaviour of health workers and the health
outcomes of patients.30 A study in Uganda provides a
welcome exception and finds that activating
community involvement can have substantial effects
[15]. Providing an intensive intervention where
information is provided to both community members
and staff, and both parties are activated in different
meetings and then brought together, the study finds
large impacts, including substantial increases in
utilization, improved health, reduced child mortality
and increased child weight. A follow-up study com-
pares the effect of this intervention combining
provision of information and activation of staff and
community, with the impact of an activation interven-
tion only, where no additional information is pro-
vided. In contrast to the former, the latter is found to
have little impact on health worker performance and
the quantity and quality of health care. The study
concludes that enhanced participation alone has little
impact without providing additional information.
Given its design, it cannot say much about the con-
tribution of participation.
Other studies find more limited impact of increased
community involvement. Phillips et al. [76], using a
randomized evaluation of community-based provision of
nutrition information to mothers of young children, find
that including volunteers in health service delivery in
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Ghana did change health practices but had no effect on
health outcomes like child growth, but this changed
when they worked alongside trained nurses. Similarly, a
study in Nepal finds that the involvement of local com-
munity facilitators improved health behaviours, but the
effect on outcomes was less clear cut [55]. Tripathy et al.
[96] find that local facilitators reduced neonatal deaths
and increased breastfeeding at 6 weeks but observed lit-
tle difference in health-seeking behaviour in Orissa and
Jharkland.
Training
The discussions suggested training as a way forward, and
this was confirmed by later studies which emphasized the
potential impact of improved skills [21]. Enhanced
training of health workers is often seen as an important
way forward to ameliorating the quality of health care.
There are clear examples where the curriculum does not
capture local disease realities, particularly the disease
burden of the poor and those in rural areas, leaving ample
room for improvement. Mozambique (non-physician)
surgeons, for instance, until recently received no training
in HIV/AIDS, even though it was the most common
disease they treated. Over the last two decades, many
countries have updated their curriculums, with the
Malawi approach that tailors content of the training to
meeting the community’s most pressing needs, often used
as a model. Recent examples are South Africa’s Walter
Sisulu University, community-based programmes at
Jimma University in Ethiopia and University of Gezira in
Sudan, as well as initiatives at Makerere University in
Uganda, as well as the National University of Rwanda,
who made epidemiology-based curriculum revisions.
However, the scarce existing evidence indicates that, on
the whole, health workers know what to do; the failure lies
in applying their knowledge [28]. This suggests that the
traditional focus on training, emphasizing the accumula-
tion of knowledge skills, should be extended to building
non-cognitive, socio-emotional skills, in order to amelior-
ate attitudes and shift norms, such that existing know-
ledge is applied.
The earlier mentioned pilot study by Vasan (2015)
illustrates how a training that aims at improving health
workers’ adherence to preferred practice has significant
effects on health worker behaviour. A recent twinning
programme between Rwanda and US professionals
shows potential promise [99].
These examples highlight that, while health worker
norms are often seen as exogenous and difficult to
change, training may offer a potential way to shift
professional norms. Teaching health workers how to
increase the quality of care and improve their patient
management skills can increase awareness and improve
attitudes, whether the training is general or focuses on
specific groups of patients, like people living with HIV/
AIDS. Training may also have long-term effects, as
norms tend to be internalized over time, potentially
shifting motivation more permanently. Recent work
suggests that motivation among health workers can be
fostered. Further work is needed in this largely unex-
plored area [19].
Ways forward
So how does this inform future research and policy
reform? What is the appropriate theoretical framework,
what type of research is needed and what are feasible
hypotheses? Our findings indicate that microeconomic
and personnel institutional factors play a key role in
explaining both health workers’ on-the-job performance
and career choice, two outcomes that are best analysed
separately. To understand health worker performance,
the classic principal agent model provides a good start-
ing point but needs to be expanded beyond incentives
and monitoring to also take into account intrinsic motiv-
ation and norms. To analyse health worker career
choice, standard models from labour economics provide
a good starting point but again need to be extended to
allow for a role of workplace culture and health worker
motivation.
A next step is to test with quantitative research the
causal hypothesis generated by this and other qualitative
research. Rigorous evidence that tests the causal effect of
the four institutional factors on health worker
performance and career choice is growing but still thin. A
commonly raised objection is that there is (too) little
observed variation in these factors within a specific
context. The results of our study indicates that this is not
necessarily the case as incentive design, monitoring
arrangements, workplace culture and the motivation of
health workers can vary considerably across sectors,
between urban and rural areas, and over time. This opens
up important opportunities. A handful of recent efforts
makes creative use of randomized control trials to do just
that, testing the causal impacts of performance pay [7],
community monitoring [15] and intrinsic motivation [3].
Another emerging strand of work makes use of
behavioural games to gain further insights on mechanisms
and pathways, either as standalone lab-in-the field games
(see [8]) or as games combined with RCTs (see [10]). The
implementation of and interest in fresh initiatives—like
performance pay, the establishment of community health
committees and improved training—in the case of
Rwanda, can create further opportunities to improve our
understanding of how these institutional factors can help
improve health worker performance and career choice
and ultimately ameliorate health outcomes.
Rwanda’s Ministry of Health’s current Human Resources
for Health (HRH) Strategic Plan and Operational Plan
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have adopted many of the issues identified in this study.
Focusing on how to fill the gaps in numbers and
performance of human resources, the strategic plan sets
out an ambitious agenda with six strategic HRH
objectives: (i) strengthen the collegial approach; (ii)
increase quantity, scope and quality; (iii) strengthen the
capacity of teaching institutions; (iv) improve the capacity
to attract, recruit and retain and motivate health
professionals; (v) enhance the financing of HRH, including
innovative approaches; and (vi) improve monitoring and
evaluation of HRH [66, 67]. These are then translated in
interventions and in implementing activities as part of the
HRH Operational plan.31 The planned activities speak
directly to the four factors raised in this study:
remuneration, monitoring and accountability, professional
and workplace norms and motivation and professional
training, illustrating the operational potential of this
framework.
Conclusion
Personnel institutions are key for development, but our
understanding of their role for health service delivery is
still shallow. With the growing consensus that health
worker performance is at the core of health care, the
question arises how existing institutional design affects
health worker behaviour and how it can contribute to
improvement in health outcomes. Using qualitative
semi-structured research, we held discussions with
health workers and users of health services in Rwanda, a
country with common health care problems and a dy-
namic institutional environment. The objective of this
research was to identify the problems and challenges
with health worker behaviour and to explore key micro-
economic and personnel institutional factors that help to
explain this behaviour. We then revisit the results of this
study 10 years later to evaluate the findings and observe
that, despite a number of interventions, the findings
remain highly relevant. This is also reflected in the
Ministry’s current strategic and operational plans, which
aim to address the issues raised in this study.
The challenges we identify are similar to those observed
in other countries in Sub-Sahara Africa and beyond and
include issues both related to the size and distribution of
the workforce, as well as to health workers’ on-the-job
performance. The former include a shortage of health
workers for specific posts like those in rural areas, in the
public sector and in high HIV/AIDS-infected areas.
Performance problems, identified by both health workers
and patients, include the poor attitudes of health workers
towards patients, their frequent absenteeism, their engage-
ment in corruption and embezzlement and their lack of
medical and patient management skills, confirming the
picture painted by similar research in other countries.
Regarding explanatory factors, four institutional factors
that affect health worker behaviour and allocation emerge:
extrinsic incentives, monitoring, norms and intrinsic
motivation. On extrinsic incentives, our findings underline
the need to consider a broader range of incentives, beyond
the narrow focus of earnings. The findings also underline
the importance of monitoring, or the lack thereof, as well
as the key role that norms and intrinsic motivation play.
Both the initial interviews and later studies identify
innovative initiatives that show promise but also need close
evaluation to address their shortcomings; these include
performance pay, community monitoring and improved
training of health workers. Future study and evaluation is
needed to help fine tune these approaches.
Endnotes
1See for example Jaffre and Olivier de Sardan [45] for
urban areas in Francophone Africa, McPake et al. [59]
on coping strategies, Ferrinho et al. [36] on dual
practice, Belli et al. [12] on informal charging and
corruption, Franco et al. [39] on motivation and
Lindelow and Serneels [54] on performance problems of
health workers in general in Ethiopia. Early quantitative
evidence on absenteeism (see [22]) has been confirmed
and extended, documenting poor performance in
other dimensions, by recent work for Kenya,
Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo and Uganda
and under way for other African countries (see
http://www.sdindicators.org//). These studies also
show weaknesses in terms of case load, diagnostic
accuracy and adherence to clinical guidelines, as well
as challenges with the availability of drugs and
quality of infrastructure.
2North’s [73] classic definition of institutions refers
to rules, incentive structures and organisations and is
well suited for the issues that come up in this study.
Emerging work on personnel economics of the state
underline the promise of this approach (see for
instance [38]).
3Note that institutions can be seen as building blocks
of systems, which focus on the linkages between these
building blocks ([43]).
4It had less than one fourth physicians per 1000
inhabitants compared to Sub-Sahara Africa as a whole,
less than one half nurses and midwives, less that a six-
teenth dentists and technicians and about half the phar-
macists and technicians, in 2005 [106].
5A key strength of group interviews lies in the interaction
between group members. Group discussions—in contrast to
individual interviews—allow researchers to elicit a multitude
of views and contrast these. Group discussions may also
function as an ‘information quality filter’: highly individual or
extreme points of view will provoke disagreement from
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other participants. Pragmatically, they permit the collection
of wide data in a relatively short time span.
6Selection criteria were well respected overall. Some
difficulties arose in finding rural female doctors and
health workers active in rural private facilities. Equality
of participants in each group is important to enable
comparison between groups. Since the group with
PLWHA will be considered on its own, nine participants
were allowed.
7Each script focused on a number of issues to which a
prompt or trigger question is associated. Five different
scripts were developed and can be obtained upon simple
request. At the start of the group discussions,
participants were informed about the objective of the
study, its independent academic character warranted full
confidentiality, and were invited to sign a consent form.
At the end of the discussion, participants filled out an
information sheet and were reimbursed for transport
costs.
8The service index is a weighted sum of the volume of
the main health services produced in the primary health
care facilities. This downward trend has to be
interpreted with caution as it cannot say anything about
quality. A high indicator may coincide with low quality
of care.
9The study focuses on adult and adolescents primary
care delivery in eight rural health centres in southeast
Rwanda and observed close to 500 consultations.
10Carrying out surprise visits, the studies find that
45% of health providers were absent in Uganda, with
the highest absence rate (55% absence) among nurses
in rural areas. In Tanzania, 21% was absent. In
Uganda, the majority of these were approved absence,
and the study concludes that these ‘are thus within
management’s power to influence suggesting that the
problem of low provider effort is largely a reflection
of suboptimal management of human resources.’ An
earlier pilot study found time spent counselling
patients per clinician per day to be 36 (26) minutes
in urban (rural) Tanzania.
11Case load is often seen as a potential indicator of the
consequences of health worker shortages, which may
cause a rise in caseload and compromise service quality.
12Focusing on specific conditions, health workers were
found to provide a correct diagnosis for 58% of the
tracer conditions in Uganda and 57% in Tanzania (for
instance, diarrhoea with dehydration and malaria with
anaemia). In just over a third of the cases (35%) did they
provide the correct clinical guidelines for these
conditions in either country. For maternal and neonatal
complications, only 19% followed the correct treatment
actions in Uganda.
13The project’s budget rose from USD 0.8 million in
2004 to USD 8.9 million in 2007 [60].
14Rusa et al. [80] evaluating an early pilot version of
the intervention—which was strongly adapted before
scale-up—argue that improvements in utilization during
the pilot were primarily in areas that had not previously
been well organised.
15While the scheme goes under the name of
‘Community based health insurance’, it does not have
the typical characteristics ascribed to these types of
schemes. It is strongly managed from above, owned
by the state and seems to function more like a
parastatal, with compulsory membership through
payment of a flat fee. Some have argued that the
scheme acts more like a tax.
16Two overview studies indicate that the responsiveness
of labour supply of nurses to a rise in wages may be
limited in high-income countries, around 0.30 [91] or
often close to zero [2].
17Chaudhury et al. [22] were the first to provide
systematic evidence of health worker absenteeism across
countries using unannounced visits to primary health
clinics in Bangladesh, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Peru,
and Uganda. They found that more than a third of
health workers were absent. A study on India reports
close to 40% absenteeism rates, ranging from 30% in
Madhya Pradesh to over 67% in Bihar. An earlier study
in rural Udaipur District in Rajasthan, measures absence
more intensively through weekly unannounced visits on
random days for one year, and found average absence
rate of 36%, and 45% in rural subcenters [5]. Similar
figures are found in a more recent survey of health
centres in Rajasthan, India (27% in general and 36%
among doctors, see [23]). In Sub-Saharan Africa. Bjork-
man and Svensson [15] observe an absence rate of 47%
in Uganda. Another study finds a similar figure (48%) in
Bushenyi District in Uganda [98]. A 2008 study in
Zambia, measuring absenteeism on the day of the survey
(and not through strict surprise visits), finds 31% of doc-
tors, 20% of clinical officers, and 14% of midwives and
other clinical staff to be absent.
18The earlier mentioned study in Ethiopia, using
contingent valuation, indicated that to get 80% of health
workers to take up a rural position, public sector salaries
for nurses and doctors need to increase 57 and 83%,
respectively, suggesting that small changes in salaries
will have a limited effect on the distribution of health
workers. One reason seems to be that in most low-
income countries, the discrepancy in amenities between
rural and urban areas may be too large to be compen-
sated by salaries alone [84]. A discrete choice experi-
ment study focusing on doctors in Ethiopia finds that
doubling wages would increase the share of doctors will-
ing to work in rural areas from 7% to over 50%, while
for nurses doubling salaries would increase those willing
to work in rural areas from 4 to 27% [42]. Analysis for
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Tanzania confirms similar strong effects of increasing
salary and hardship allowance, with women less respon-
sive to these financial incentives [47]. Focusing on
Vietnam, another survey [104] finds that increased pay
would be the single most powerful incentive to get
health workers willing to locate in rural areas. An older
study for Indonesia, Chomitz et al. [24] finds that mod-
est cash incentives can make health workers more likely
to work in moderately remote areas but that staffing of
very remote areas would be prohibitively expensive.
19Among benefits, housing appears to be important.
The study of doctors in Ethiopia finds that providing
high-quality housing would increase the share of doctors
willing to work in rural areas to 27% or the equivalent of
a wage bonus of 46% [42]. In Tanzania and Malawi,
housing is also found to be important. Being able to have
a second job is another factor that seems to play an im-
portant role [47, 57].
20Continued access to professional training are found to
be important motivating factors for job choice among
future health workers in Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, South
Africa, Tanzania, Thailand and Vietnam [16, 47, 57, 86,
104].
21See for example Dixit [31] and Le Grand [52] for a
discussion on these themes for civil servants in general.
22For example, on teacher absenteeism [33], on the
management and allocation of funds at the school level
[79] and on student-learning outcomes [10]. Local moni-
toring by head teachers as well as communities of bene-
ficiaries have had substantial effects on teacher presence
and student-learning outcomes (see [10, 25]).
23Recent work confirms possible collusion between
workers and monitors. A recent study on environmental
auditors in Gujarat shows that random allocation of
monitors to plants resulted in more reduced pollution
than when monitors were chosen by the plants
themselves [32].
24In response to these concerns, Rwanda established a
national zero-tolerance for corruption in 2006, which
announced a number of measures including regular un-
announced evaluations, investigation of suspicious re-
ports, on-site verification of data and validation of
receipts of services by a random sample of patients who
are recorded. It is unclear to what extent these measures
have been followed through, and we know of no evalu-
ation. Bucagu et al. [21] hold a plea for further research
to develop systems that improve monitoring but keep
the consequences of gaming to a minimum
25See Bartel et al. [11], Barr and Serneels [9] and Bowles et
al. [18] for work on workplace norms outside the health
sector.
26See for example Deci [30], Krepps [49] and Benabou and
Tirole [14]. Intrinsic motivation is typically seen as an
individual characteristic that is a long term product of both
nature and nurture, and that cannot be changed in the short
term.
27Which is more likely to arise in some environments—such
as NGOs—than in others because these environments are
better suited to overcome agency problems see Glaeser, [41,
75].
28Burundi (2), DRC (2), Egypt, Philippines (2), Rwanda
29See de Bruin et al. [29]; Eijkenaar et al. [34]; Kondo
et al. [48]; Mendelson et al. [61].
30The poverty of causal evidence on participatory
development initiatives is not restricted to the health
sector, as documented by Mansuri and Rao [56]
31The operational plan sets out a number of focused
activities, including a health worker labour market study to
take stock of numbers, needs and distribution of health
worker and a second study to identify malpractices and
unethical behaviour. It plans the development of innovative
incentives to attract and retain health personnel, develop an
award system for the best performing health professionals
and draft a law setting out a career development system for
health professionals. Other activities include the plans to
develop a certified ethics course, integrating modules of
leadership, management and ethics in the training of health
professionals [68].
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